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Development of Utility Theory and Utility Paradoxes 
 
ABSTRACT:1 
Since the pioneering work of von Neumann and Morgenstern in 19442 there have been 
many developments in Expected Utility theory.  In order to explain decision making behavior 
economists have created increasingly broad and complex models of utility theory. This paper 
seeks to describe various utility models, how they model choices among ambiguous and lottery-
type situations, and how they respond to the Ellsberg and Allais paradoxes.  This paper also 
attempts to communicate the historical development of utility models and provide a fresh 
perspective on the development of utility models. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
§ Senior Undergraduate, Lawrence University, Appleton Wi., May 2016. 
1 This paper would not have been possible without the guidance provided by Professor Adam 
Galambos (Lawrence University, Appleton Wi.), and Professor Merton Finkler (Lawrence 
University, Appleton, Wi.), to whom I am extremely grateful. 
2	  Neumann, John von, Morgenstern, Oskar, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.  
Princeton N.J., U.S.A: Princeton University Press, 1944	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Section 1: The Differences Between Utility Theorists 
1.1: Introduction 
There are many economists who focus on Expected Utility, Behavioral Economics, 
Bounded-Rationality theory, and other branches that have direct connections to utility theory.  
Two major pioneers of utility theory are John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern with their 
axiomatization of the Expected Utility model in 1944. Soon afterwards, paradoxes arose that 
showed that the von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility model was not applicable in every 
lottery-type situation.  Several economists, namely, Maurice Allais, Daniel Ellsberg, and Mark 
Machina, identified several paradoxes to various utility theories.  These paradoxes have shown 
that economists need better utility models, and with that necessity, came various Non-Expected 
Utility models such as Rank-Dependent Utility, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Maxmin Expected 
Utility theory, amongst many others.  These models have shown the trends in utility theory and 
their development either empirically or abstractly.  Despite many obstacles, it seems that 
economists have finally discovered solutions to these paradoxes, though there have been many 
barriers.  These impediments have paved the way to an important discovery, which is that the 
current utility models are suitable for modeling utility and predicting decisions, in particular 
settings, but they are not always applicable.  Dani Rodrik (2015) explains a similar phenomenon 
in his book Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science, though in the 
context of macroeconomics.3  To fully understand the Non-Expected Utility models and the 
responses given to each model, it is necessary to start by turning to the recent literature on 
Bounded-Rationality theory and Neoclassical utility theory.   
 This paper uses the development of utility theory, as well as the paradoxes that are 
associated with utility theories, and argues that economists should be viewing the history of 
thought within utility theory differently.  In order to develop that argument, I take several 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Rodrik, Dani, Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science.  New York, 
New York, U.S.A: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2015 
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different utility models and discuss their theorems and axioms in order to show the differences in 
these various models and display how each model independently resolves several paradoxes to 
the von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility model.  By showing the differences in each 
model and its resolutions to the paradoxes, I am able to develop the argument that different 
utility models, developed through various theoretical approaches ranging from neoclassical to 
behavioral, are related.  I also discuss the neoclassical view of utility theory and show that all of 
these models, despite the differences in economic modeling assumptions, are connected, and 
relevant for different situations of choice under ambiguity.  I take those differences in 
development and create a utility theory development tree to explicitly display each model with 
its connections to different research branches in economics.  I do this to contrast the traditional 
view of the linear development of utility theories which is shown when I discuss the trends of 
utility models.  
1.2: Various Economic Thought Processes and Modeling 
Matthew Rabin (2013)4 lays out the ways in which neoclassical economists can use 
Bounded-Rationality, and limits on information in optimization, to properly model the behavior 
of agents.  This suggests that the way to make progress in the study of Bounded-Rationality and 
utility models is to build on the Neoclassical Optimization model.  Instead of discrediting 
neoclassicism, it is more beneficial for utility theorists to look at the successes of Neoclassical 
utility models and the successes of other branches of utility theories.  Furthermore, in another 
paper, “An interpretive history of challenges to neoclassical microeconomics and how they have 
fared,” Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard Nelson (2013)5 are skeptical of the neoclassical views of 
economics.  They are concerned with the increased amount of optimization and advanced 
mathematics used in economics.  Their views in this paper claim that nonmathematical work is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Rabin, Matthew.  “Incorporating Limited Rationality into Economics.” Journal of Economic 
Literature 2013.  Vol. 51(2): 528-543 
5 Mazzoleni, Roberto, Nelson, Richard.  “An interpretive history of challenges to neoclassical 
microeconomics and how they have fared.” Journal of Industrial and Corporate Change.  Vol. 
22(6): 1409-1451 
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being pushed out of economic publications.  Sidney Winter (2013)6 furthers the points made by 
Mazzoleni and Nelson, by stating that equilibrium, in the view of economists, is too frequently 
viewed only in the neoclassical sense.   Winter broadens this view with the comment that the 
neoclassical commitment to optimizing actors has a high opportunity cost because it distorts the 
priorities of economics. 
 Winter positively responded to Mazzoleni and Nelson, and he attempted to challenge 
neoclassical models by stating that, “increasing mathematization of economic theorizing since 
World War II has amplified the negative consequences of the underlying flaws in the 
neoclassical account of economic life.”  This statement by Winter is rather strong, even for a 
modern economist, given the progress made in economics since the end of World War II.  
Winter then posed questions regarding the philosophy of economics: “Is economics a science, or 
could it be?  What is it really about?  On what basis should theoretical premises be assessed?”  
These are interesting questions that need to be addressed by using economic theory and through 
looking at the development of various models in economic theory.  It is possible to answer 
Winter’s question because the theoretical premise that economics bases itself on is the 
development of models.  In the realm of utility theory, I seek to address the development of 
utility theory and how economists have generated better models that bring economics and the 
development of utility theory into a more scientific realm.  However, it is necessary to view 
different branches of economic thought within utility theory so that cross examination and 
progress within utility theory can be achieved.  By these different branches, I mean the different 
ways in which utility theory has developed, and that is though Behavioral [Economic] 
development, Neoclassical development, and Subjective (probability)7 development.  Before 
discussing the newer models and developments in utility theory, it is necessary to show how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Winter, Sidney.  “Optimization as a constraint: a comment on Mazzoleni and Nelson.”  Journal 
of Industrial and Corporate Change.  Vol. 23(2): 613-631 
7 Where Subjective probability refers to probabilities derived from an agents’ personal judgment 
of the outcomes of a lottery 
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utility theory came to the development of Non-Expected Utility models.  This starts with the St. 
Petersburg Paradox, which eventually led to many interesting developments, most importantly, 
the axiomatization and model built by von Neumann and Morgenstern, which led to various 
paradoxes that are described in the next section. 
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Section 2: von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility and the Paradoxes 
 2.1: St. Petersburg Paradox 
Before explaining Non-Expected Utility theory, it is important to understand the origins 
of utility theory which occurred through the developments of the St. Petersburg, Allais, and 
Ellsberg paradoxes. Expected Utility theory was first proposed as a solution to the St. Petersburg 
paradox.  The St. Petersburg paradox,8 which challenges the expected value theory of utility, 
states:  
Assume a casino offers a game of chance to players where a fair coin is tossed at each stage, and 
the pot starts at two dollars and doubles for each head.  When the first tails appears, the game 
ends and the player collects whatever is in the pot.   Therefore, the player wins 2n dollars where 
n is the number of heads that have appeared plus one.  So the question for the casino is, how 
much should a player be charged to play the game, or how much would a player be willing to 
pay in order to play this game?  In order to come to an answer, early economists looked at the 
expected value of this game: 
𝐸𝑉 = 12 ∗ 2 + 14 ∗ 4 + 18 ∗ 8 +⋯	  𝐸𝑉 = 1 + 1 + 1 +⋯	  ∴ :	  𝐸𝑉 = ∞ 
 Clearly, people are not going to pay an infinite amount to play this game, and their 
expected payout will not be infinite, thus it became a paradox.  
2.2: Expected Utility and Axioms 
Expected Utility theory arose as a solution to the St. Petersburg paradox.  The solution 
was proposed by Daniel Bernoulli, and was formalized by von Neumann and Morgenstern:9 𝑝0 𝑈 𝑥03045            (1) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., and Green J., Microeconomic Theory, 6: “Choice Under 
Uncertainty.” (Oxford University Press, Inc. 1995), 185. 
9 Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., and Green J., Microeconomic Theory, 6: “Choice Under 
Uncertainty.” (Oxford University Press, Inc. 1995), 173 
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Here n is the number of states, U is the utility function of outcomes 𝑥, and the pi’s are the 
probabilities associated with the outcomes.  Bernoulli posited that people maximize their 
expected utility from a gamble, as opposed to the expected value of the gamble, which led to the 
above formula. 
Four axioms for rationality within utility functions were developed to further formalize 
Expected Utility theory.10  This axiomatization allowed economists to explain how expected 
utility maximizers act.  Some necessary notation: a preference relation is denoted by ≽ (which is 
a binary relation on the set of alternatives, 𝑋 ⊂ ℛ3, that allows preference comparisons between 
outcomes) where 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑥 ≽ 𝑦 is read as “x is at least as good as y.”  Similarly, 𝑥 ≻ 𝑦 is 
read as “x is strictly preferred to y.”  And, 𝑥~𝑦 is read as “x is indifferent to y.”11 
1.   Completeness: ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋,𝑤𝑒	  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒	  𝑥 ≽ 𝑦	  𝑜𝑟	  𝑦 ≽ 𝑥	  𝑜𝑟	  𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ	   𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ	  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑥 ∼ 𝑦  
2.   Transitivity: ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋	  𝑖𝑓	  𝑥 ≽ 𝑦	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦 ≽ 𝑧, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝑥 ≽ 𝑧 
3.   Independence: 𝑇ℎ𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	   ≽𝑜𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒	  𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠, 12	  Λ, 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑜𝑚	  𝑖𝑓	  ∀	  𝜆, 𝜆V, 𝜆VV ∈Λ	  and	  α ∈ 0,1 , we	  have: 𝜆 ≽ 𝜆V	  𝑖𝑓𝑓	  𝛼𝜆 + 1 − 𝛼 𝜆VV ≽ 𝛼𝜆V + 1 − 𝛼 𝜆′′	   
4.    Continuous: 𝑇ℎ𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≽𝑜𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒	  𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠	  	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠	  𝑖𝑓	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑎𝑛𝑦	  𝜆, 𝜆V, 𝜆VV ∈ 𝛬, 𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠:	  𝛼 ∈ 1,0 : 𝛼𝜆 + 1 − 𝛼 𝜆V ≽ 𝜆VV ⊂ [0,1] 
And 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., and Green J., Microeconomic Theory, 3: “Classical Demand 
Theory.” 6: “Choice Under Uncertainty.” (Oxford University Press, Inc. 1995), 42, 171-172 
11 Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., and Green J., Microeconomic Theory, 3: “Classical Demand 
Theory.” 1: “Preference and Choice.” (Oxford University Press, Inc. 1995), 6	  
12 Simple lotteries: 𝜆	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑎	  𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠, 𝑋,	  	  𝜆 = 𝑝5, …	  , 𝑝h 	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑝h ≥ 0	  ∀	  𝑛, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝛴3𝑝3 = 1, 𝐴𝑛𝑑	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠,	  	  𝑋 = 𝑥5, … , 𝑥3 , 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ	  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑝0 ∈ 𝜆.*  (3) 
* Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., and Green J., Microeconomic Theory, 3: “Classical Demand 
Theory.” 6: “Choice Under Uncertainty.” (Oxford University Press, Inc. 1995), 168 
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𝛼 ∈ 1,0 : 𝜆VV ≽ 𝛼𝜆 + 1 − 𝛼 𝜆V ⊂ 0,1  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑. 13           (2, a-d) 
Another important aspect of this axiomatization was that it formalized basic preference theory in 
a way that had previously not been done.  Daniel Bernoulli may have formalized the Expected 
Utility function, but the axiomatization allowed economists to relate the theory to choice 
behavior.  These axioms led to many new models and a basis for utility theory.  The 
Independence axiom is the most important to fully understand.  It says that if we mix each of two 
lotteries with a third one, then the preference ordering of the two resulting mixtures does not 
depend on the third lottery used, hence independence.14 
2.3: The Allais Paradox 
Though the development of the von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility model was, 
and still is, massively important, it led to the Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961) paradoxes.  
These paradoxes focus primarily on the independence axiom and show that agents cannot always 
be modeled using Expected Utility for choices under uncertainty.  The Allais paradox15 states: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟	  𝑎	  𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒	  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠	   𝑁 = 3 :	  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒	  𝐴: 2,500,000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒	  𝐵: 500,000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒	  𝐶: 0	  𝐴𝑛𝑑, 𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠	  𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛	  𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠: 𝜆5 = 0,1,0 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝜆5V = . 1, .89, .01  and 𝜆v = 0, .11, .89 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝜆vV = (.1, 0, .9)  
Allais found that the common choices for agents in experimental situations: 𝜆5 ≻ 𝜆5V 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝜆vV ≻ 𝜆v 
The issue is that in the Expected Utility model, the decisions are not consistent.       
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Closed sets: 𝐹𝑖𝑥	  𝑎	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝛺 ⊂ ℛ3.	  	  𝐴	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝛣 ⊂ 𝛺	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑	  𝑖𝑓𝑓	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦	  𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  	  𝜔~ 𝜔 ∈ 𝛺,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝜔~ ∈ 𝛣	  ∀	  𝑚,𝑤𝑒	  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒	  𝜔 ∈ 𝛣       (4) 
14 Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., and Green J., Microeconomic Theory, 3: “Classical Demand 
Theory.” 6: “Choice Under Uncertainty.” (Oxford University Press, Inc. 1995), 171 
15 Allais, Maurice, “Le Comportement de l’Homme Ratinel devant le Risque, Critique des 
Postulates et Axiom de l’Ecole Americaine.” Econometrica, October 1953, 503-546 
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To elaborate, suppose a von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility function denoted by the 
values of the respective prizes: 𝑢v, 𝑢, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑢.  So the choice 𝜆5 ≻ 𝜆5V  then implies: 𝑢 > . 1 𝑢v + . 89 𝑢 + . 01 𝑢	  𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔: . 89 𝑢 − . 89 𝑢	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ	  𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒:	  . 11 𝑢 + . 89 𝑢 > . 1 𝑢v + . 9 𝑢; 	  𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠	  𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠:	  55,000 ≯ 250,000	  
Therefore, preferences should state: 𝜆v ≻ 𝜆vV , which is not what experimental subjects generally 
choose.  This displays an inconsistency in von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility, because 
it shows the phenomenon of preference reversals, which is inconsistent with the independence 
axiom. 
2.4: The Ellsberg Paradox 
The next paradox to von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility is the Ellsberg (1961)16 
paradox.  This paradox is especially important for understanding Non-Expected Utility theory 
because it was the primary foundation that inspired Non-Expected Utility theories.  The Ellsberg 
Paradox is as follows:	  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟	  𝑎	  𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒	  𝑢𝑟𝑛	  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔	  30	  𝑟𝑒𝑑	  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  60	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑒𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘	  𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠	  𝑛𝑜𝑡	  𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤	  ℎ𝑜𝑤	  𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦	  𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘	  𝑜𝑟	  𝑦𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤	  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠,	   𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑎	  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	  𝑜𝑓	  60	  𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤	  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠.	  	  𝐴𝑛	  𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛	  𝑎	  𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  	  𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠	  𝛽	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  	  𝜁	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡	  𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠	  𝛾	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝛿	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡.	  	  	  𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠	  𝑎𝑟𝑒: 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤	  1:	  	  𝛽: $100	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑎	  𝑟𝑒𝑑	  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙  or   𝜁: $100	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑎	  𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘	  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤	  2:	  𝛾: $100	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑎	  𝑟𝑒𝑑	  𝑜𝑟	  𝑦𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤	  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙     or     𝛿: $100	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑎	  𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘	  𝑜𝑟	  𝑦𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤	  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 
The decision relies on uncertainty and probability, and the outcome is simply whether the ball is 
red or non-red: 5	   v. v in the experimental setting.  The experimental evidence appears to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ellsberg, Daniel.  “Risk Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms.”  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics.  Nov. 1961, Vol. 75, 643-669 
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problematic because von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility would propose that in 
choosing between the two gambles, people account for the probability that non-red balls are 
yellow versus black, and then compute the expected utility from each gamble.   
Subjects generally presented preferences 𝛽 ≻ 𝜁 in draw one and, and 𝛿 ≻ 𝛾 in draw 2.  This 
means that agents uniformly believe that that there are more red than black balls in gamble one 
and similarly they believe that there are more black and yellow balls than red and yellow balls.  
Mathematically, this leads to a contradiction, by denoting the colors of the balls as R[ed], 
Y[ellow], and B[lack], and plugging the given probabilities into the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
Expected Utility function with preferences assumed to be: 𝑈 $100 ≻ 𝑈($0): Agents usually 
choose: 
Draw 1: 𝑅[𝑈 $100 − 	  𝑈 $0 ] ≻ 	  𝐵 𝑈 $100 − 𝑈 $0 	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒, 𝑅 ≻ 𝐵        
Draw 2: 𝐵 𝑈 $100 − 𝑈 $0 ≻ 𝑅 𝑈 $100 − 𝑈 $0 	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒, 𝐵 ≻ 𝑅	         
For this to be true it would mean that in draw 1 agents believe that the probability of drawing a 
red ball, one third, is greater than drawing a black ball.  For that to be true, it means that agents 
must think that there are more yellow balls than black balls such that the probability of drawing a 
black ball is less than one-third.  However, in draw two, for agents to make this choice it means 
they believe that there are more in total of yellow plus black, as opposed to yellow plus red.  But 
this does not make sense given that in draw one they believed that there were more red balls than 
black since there were more yellow than black balls.  Represented mathematically: 
Agents in draw one believe: 𝑝 𝑅 > 𝑝 𝐵 	  𝑠𝑜	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑦	  𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑝 𝑌 > 𝑝(𝐵)	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑢𝑟𝑛, 𝑠𝑜	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑦	  𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒	  𝑅 > 𝐵	  
But in draw two: 𝑝 𝑌, 𝐵 > 𝑝 𝑌, 𝑅 , 𝑠𝑜	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑦	  𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒	  𝐵 > 𝑅 
This presents a contradiction and it shows that agents are averse to ambiguity, because even 
though in the first case they believe that there were more yellow than black balls, thus more red 
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than black; in draw two they believe that there were more yellow and black than red and black, 
thus more black than red balls in the urn. 
Yet, these are not the only paradoxes to Expected Utility theory.  There is also Machina’s 
Paradox17 and a variety of others that arise in lottery-like situations.  Through this, there were 
major developments in the field of utility theory because it seemed obvious that the von 
Neumann and Morgenstern model was not fit to handle some types of ambiguous and lottery-
type situations.  However, the von Neumann and Morgenstern model brought much clarity to 
economics because through the axiomatizations Non-Expected Utility theorists were able to have 
a framework to build new models.  These new models, which arose from these paradoxes and the 
original von Neumann and Morgernstern model, are each important in a variety of situations.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Machina, Mark., “Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved.”  Economic 
Perspectives.  Summer 1987, Vol. 1, 121-154 
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Section 3: Non-Expected Utility Theories 
3.1 Cumulative Prospect Theory 
Due to these paradoxes there has been the birth and growth of the field of Non-Expected 
Utility theory.  Major models in Non-Expected Utility theory include (Cumulative) Prospect 
Theory (1979,18 199219), Maxmin Expected Utility (1989),20 Rank-Dependent Utility theory 
(1982),21 and Yaari’s Dual Theory (1987)22 (discussed in section 4).  The first major model to be 
derived due to these paradoxes was Prospect Theory, which was published by Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky (1979). This model describes a two-stage decision process: 
•   In stage one, agents perceive various outcomes as gains and losses, as opposed to the 
von Neumann and Morgenstern model where agents maximize based on their belief of 
the final outcome.  The outcomes are then judged as gains and losses based on some 
reference point.23 
•   Then in the following evaluation phase, agents “compute” a value function with 
outcomes and probabilities and then choose the alternatives with higher utility based on 
their objective functions. 
•   The most general form of the model:  𝛴0453 𝑣 𝑥0 ∗ 𝜋 𝑝0           (5)	  
•   This states that v is the expected utility for outcomes 𝑥0, multiplied by the respective 
probabilities of each event pi with decision weight 𝜋, where a decision weight is defined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Kahneman, Daniel, Tversky, Amos., “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” 
Econometrica.  March 1979, Vol. 47(2), 263-291   
19 Kahneman, Daniel., Tversky, Amos. “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty.”  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1992.  Vol. 5, 297-323	  
20 Gilboa, Itzhak, Schmeidler, David.  “Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior.”  
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1989, Vol. 18, 141-153 
21 Quiggin, John. “A theory of anticipated utility.” Journal of economics behavior and 
organization, Vol. 3(4), 323-343 
22 Yaari, Menahem. “The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk.” Econometrica, Jan. 1987, Vol. 
55(1), 95-115. 
23 Also see:  Samuelson, Paul., “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behavior.” 
Economica, Feb. 1938., Vol. 5(17), 61-71 
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as some weight reflecting the impact the probability of an outcome has on an agents’ 
decisions.  Additionally, the value function passes through the reference point.  The 
graph generally appears as:	  
24	  
This graph shows how people perceive gains and losses with the reference point being the origin.  
Prospect theory proposed	  that agents maximize total utility based on a reference point, as 
opposed to ignoring the reference point such that they maximize total utility for one set of 
outcomes, as it is assumed in the von Neumann-Morgenstern model.  However, the original 
paper from 1979 was found to have a major problem, which was later solved by John Quiggin 
(1982).  That problem was that the model violated first-order stochastic dominance, meaning that 
the following: 𝐿𝑒𝑡	  	  𝑥	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑥	  𝑏𝑒	  𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚	  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Tversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel. “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.”  The 
Journal of Business, Oct. 1986, Vol. 59(4-2), S251-S278 
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  𝐹 𝑥 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑:	  𝐹 𝑥 .	  	  	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝐹	  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 − 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟	  𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦	  𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐹	  𝑖𝑓	  𝐹(𝑥) ≤ 𝐹 𝑥 25  
(6) 
Essentially, since Prospect Theory occasionally violated first-order stochastic dominance, it is 
possible that a decision maker that would be described by Prospect Theory would prefer a lottery 
to one that stochastically dominates it. 
 Cumulative Prospect Theory resolved this issue and added various new axioms which 
made it different from Expected Utility theory and Prospect Theory.  In Cumulative Prospect 
Theory, Kahneman and Tversky keep the axioms of completeness and transitivity, but change 
the independence axiom.  They modify independence to Comonotonic Independence.  In order to 
properly understand Comonotonic Independence, it is necessary to define strict monotonicity and 
comonotonicity with regards to preference relationships: 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡	  𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦:	  𝐴	  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≽ 𝑜𝑛	  𝑋	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝑖𝑓	  ∀	  𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦 ≫𝑥	  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑦 ≻ 𝑥.	  	  𝑇ℎ𝑒	  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝑖𝑓	  𝑦 ≥ 𝑥	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦 ≠𝑥	  𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ	  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑦 ≻ 𝑥         (7)	  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠26	  𝑓	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑔	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  	  𝑖𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑛𝑜	  𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠,	  𝑠, 𝑠V	  𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡:	  𝑓 𝑠 ≻ 𝑓 𝑠V 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑔 𝑠 ≼ 𝑔 𝑠V       (8) 
Since Kahneman and Tversky defined comonotonicity within prospects they then could define a 
new independence axiom, namely Comonotonic Independence, which is independence defined 
for comonotonic, strictly monotonic prospects.  Comonotonic Independence:  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑓 ≻ 𝑔	  	  ⟹ 𝛼𝑓 + 1 − 𝛼 ℎ ≻ 𝛼𝑔 + 1 − 𝛼 ℎ	  	  	  ∀𝛼 ∈ 0,1 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑓, 𝑔, ℎ	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐     (9)	  𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑	  𝑎𝑠	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠	  𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛	  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Joshi, Mark, Paterson, Jane., Introduction to Mathematical Portfolio Theory.  Cambridge 
Mass. U.S.A. Cambridge University Press. 134, 2013 	  
26 Defined on next page 
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𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐 
This axiom says that Comonotonic Independence axiom holds for comonotonic prospects, but it 
does not require independence to hold for prospects that are not comonotonic. 27  
This is important because it implies a sense of ordering within the model, and that was a primary 
achievement from Quiggin in his Rank-Dependent Utility model.  This method used by Quiggin 
helped Kahneman and Tversky to change their original Prospect Theory model to Cumulative 
Prospect Theory.28  Additionally, Cumulative Prospect Theory also satisfies another condition, 
which is referred to as double matching: ∀	  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	  𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑖𝑓	  𝑓 ≈ 𝑔	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑓 ≈ 𝑔, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝑓 ≈ 𝑔,	  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑔 ∈ ℛ	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑓	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑔 ∈ ℛ       (10) 
Whereas prospects (also known as acts) are defined as: 𝐹 = 𝑓: 𝑆 → 𝑋 ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝐹	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠, 𝑓.	  	  𝑆	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑎	  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑋	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠.	      (11) 
The double matching postulate means that if the positive parts of prospects f and g and the 
negative portions of the prospects are indifferent, then the agent is indifferent to the prospects.   
From double matching and the use of the Comonotonic Independence, Kahneman and Tversky 
define the first of two theorems in their paper, the first of which states: 
Theorem 1:           (12) 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	   𝐹, ≽ 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	   𝐹, ≽ 	  𝑐𝑎𝑛	  𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ	  𝑏𝑒	  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝑏𝑦	  𝑎	  𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙.	  	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛	   𝐹, ≽ 	  𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑦	  𝑖𝑓𝑓	  𝑖𝑡	  𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  	  𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
Where a cumulative function is defined as a function that transforms each probability separately 
such that the model transforms the entire Cumulative Distribution Function.  This is done so that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 ℎ 𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑠) 
28 Tuthill, Jonathan, Frechette, Darren., “Non-expected Utility Theories: Weighted Expected, 
Rank Dependent, and, Cumulative Prospect Theory.”  St. Louis, Missouri., April 2002. P. 17. 
Accessed April 2016.  http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/19073/1/cp02tu01.pdf 
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events with extremely small probabilities are not overweighed like they were in Prospect 
Theory.29 Cumulative Prospect Theory can only hold if double matching and Comonotonic 
Independence are satisfied.  
Based on these various postulates, Cumulative Prospect Theory defines three versions of tradeoff 
consistency, which deal with preference relationships among different prospects in various 
states.  First, they define Tradeoff Consistency (TC), which is satisfied by Expected Utility 
theory: 𝐼𝑓	  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦	  𝑥, 𝑥V, 𝑦, 𝑦V ∈ 𝑋, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦	  𝑓, 𝑓V, 𝑔, 𝑔V ∈ 𝐹, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝑙𝑒𝑡	  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	   𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝑥 𝑟 𝑓	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑥	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒	  𝑟	  𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  	  𝑓	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠. 𝑆𝑜	  𝑎	  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓	  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦	  𝑖𝑓:	   𝑥 𝑠 𝑓 ≽ 𝑦 𝑠 𝑔, 	  𝑥V 𝑠 𝑓 ≽ 𝑦V 𝑠 𝑔	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑥 𝑡 𝑓V ≽ 𝑦 𝑡 𝑔V	  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑥V 𝑡 𝑓V ≽ 𝑦V 𝑡 𝑔′  (13) 
This means that state s will yield result x for prospect f.  Tradeoff Consistency implies that for 
various preference relationships to be satisfied then yield x in state s for prospect f is at least as 
preferred to y in state s for prospect g.  In conjunction, yield x’ in state s for prospect f must be at 
least as preferred to yield y’ in state s for prospect g.  In addition to that, state t must yield x for 
prospect f’ which must be at least as preferred to yield y in the same state for prospect g’.  
Therefore, yield x’ in state t for prospect f’ must be at least as preferred to y’ in state t for 
prospect g’.  This is rather abstract, but it is complete and states the satisfactory and “rational” 
preference relationships for trades.  Tradeoff Consistency is the condition that implies that a von 
Neumann and Morgernstern utility function cannot have preference reversals.  It says that if an 
agent prefers one prospect to another in one state, they will prefer that same prospect in a 
different state as well.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Kahneman, Daniel, Tversky, Amos., “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty.”  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1992.  Vol. 5, 299 
	  
	  
18	  
Tradeoff Consistency, although important, is violated by the Allais paradox described earlier.  
So, when Expected Utility theory does not hold, then one can consider the next tradeoff 
consistency to explain agent behavior.  This tradeoff consistency is titled Comonotonic Tradeoff 
Consistency: 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓	  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦	   𝐶𝑇𝐶 	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟	  𝑇𝐶	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	  	  𝑥 𝑠 𝑓, 𝑦 𝑠 𝑔, 𝑥V 𝑠 𝑓, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦V 𝑠 𝑔	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	  	  𝑥 𝑡 𝑓V, 𝑦 𝑡 𝑔V, 𝑥V 𝑡 𝑓V	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦′{𝑡}𝑔′.         (14) 
Essentially Comonotonic Tradeoff Consistency says that if in state s the yields x, y, x’, and y’ for 
prospects f and g (respectively) are comparable and non-decreasing with the outcomes in state s 
and similar yields for prospects f’ and g’ then prospects are comonotonic and satisfy 
Comonotonic Tradeoff Consistency. Therefore, whenever prospects are pairwise comonotonic 
and the value functions have particular yields that satisfy comonotonicity between pairwise 
decisions, then Comonotonic Tradeoff Consistency holds.  Comonotonic Tradeoff Consistency is 
a weaker consistency than Tradeoff Consistency, but it helps to explain more preference 
relations in ambiguous decisions due to the fact that it only allows comparisons of decisions that 
are comonotonic, as opposed to all decisions. 
The third tradeoff consistency defined by Kahneman and Tversky is noted as  
Sign-Comonotonic Tradeoff Consistency (SCTC): 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑	  𝑖𝑓	  𝐶𝑇𝐶	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟	  𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑥, 𝑥V, 𝑦, 𝑦V𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑒𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  	  𝑜𝑟	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒           (15) 
Sign-Comonotonic Tradeoff Consistency is the weakest of the three consistencies, and it is 
satisfied when all possible outcomes are all below or above an agents’ reference point.  
Since the various tradeoff consistencies have been defined, it is possible to define the second 
major theorem of Cumulative Prospect Theory: 
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Theorem 2:                    (16, a-c) 𝑎. 𝐸𝑈𝑇	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑖𝑓𝑓 ≽ 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑇𝐶30	  𝑏. 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑦	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑖𝑓𝑓 ≽ 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝐶𝑇𝐶31	  𝑐. 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑦	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑖𝑓𝑓 ≽ 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑆𝐶𝑇𝐶 
The second major theorem of Cumulative Prospect Theory essentially says that the model’s 
independence axioms weaken itself depending on the tradeoff consistency that holds. 
3.2: Maxmin Expected Utility 
Maxmin Expected Utility was formalized by Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler in 
1989,32 and the theory considers a closed, convex set 𝒞 of probability measures33 on state space 
S, and von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility function U( . ) and an act is evaluated 
according to: 𝑊 𝑓 ∙ = 	  min¦∈𝒞 𝑈 𝑓 ∙ 𝑑𝜇         (17) 
Where W is a utility function applied to some act 𝑓34 and is equal to the expected utility of some 
roulette lottery, where the integral is over the state of the world for each state where there exists 
a roulette lottery.35,36  An act in the paper by Gilboa and Schmeidler is defined as “functions 
from states of nature applied on some prior [sic] over a set of ‘deterministic outcomes.’”  Where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Wakker, Peter., “Prospective Reference Theory: Toward an Explanation of the Paradoxes,” 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty., 1989, The Netherlands: Kluwere Academic Publishers 
31 Wakker, Peter., “Continuous Subjective Expected Utility with Nonadditive Probabilities,” 
Journal of Mathematical Economic, 1989, Vol.18., 1-27 
32 Gilboa, Itzhak, Schmeidler, David.  “Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior.”  
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1989, Vol. 18, 141-153 
33 Also known as “Priors” which they will be called for the remainder of this paper 
34 An act is defined the same as a prospect is above  
35 In this system, a roulette lottery is defined as a game of chance with “physical probabilities” 
associated with the outcomes, where each outcome is associated with a prize.  Additionally, a 
“physical probability” is defined as a probability whose outcomes are objective and associated 
with random physical systems, such as roulette wheels**     (18)	  
36 Anscombe, F.J., Aumann, R.J., “A Definition of Subjective Probability.”  The Annals of 
Mathematical Statistics.  March 1963, Vol. 34(1), 199-205 
**Physical Probabilities: Hajek, Alan, Zalta, Edward., “Interpretations of Probability,” The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy., Winter 2012 Ed., Accessed May 2016 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/probability-interpret/ 
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a deterministic outcome is defined as outcomes that are predetermined where the bettor in this 
roulette lottery knows the possible losses and gains, known as outcomes.  This particular utility 
function was axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler, where they maintain the axioms of 
Completeness, Transitivity, Continuity, and Non-Degeneracy, which were presented by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern and show the relationship between utility and preferences.  However, 
Gilboa and Schmeidler weaken the Independence axiom and replace it with two other axioms, 
which state: 
Certainty-Independence:  ∀	  𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠	  𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝛬, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  ℎ ∈ 𝐿¨	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  ∀	  𝛼 ∈ (0,1]:	  𝑓 ≻ 𝑔	   ⟺ 𝛼𝑓 +1 − 𝛼 ℎ ≻ 𝛼𝑔 + 1 − 𝛼 ℎ37         (19) 
Uncertainty Aversion: ∀	  𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠	  𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝛬	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝛼 ∈ 0,1 : 𝑓 ∼ 𝑔	  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝛼𝑓 + 1 − 𝛼 𝑔 ≽ 𝑓       
            (20) 
These two axioms weaken the independence axiom and allow the Maxmin model to be more 
applicable, especially in Ellsberg lottery-type situations.  Standard independence allows h to be 
any act within L, whereas the Certainty-Independence restricts this to only constant acts, known 
as Lc.  Certainty-Independence is much simpler than the von Neumann and Morgenstern 
independence axiom and does not exclude hedging, where hedging is defined as the act of taking 
the position in one market to offset another.  Since hedging is not excluded, Gilboa and 
Schmeidler explain it through the Uncertainty Aversion axiom, because the axiom of 
Uncertainty Aversion provides a detailed explanation of a utility function when there exists 
ambivalent preferences, which is why it can account for uncertainty averse situations such as 
those presented in the Ellsberg paradox.38  Finally, the general Maxmin Expected Utility 
function, as described by Gilboa and Schmeidler, is: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Assume non-empty sets, and Lc as the constant functions in L0, also let L be a convex subset 
of Ys, which includes Lc.***          
38 For an example in which the act of hedging is an important feature of the Uncertainty 
Aversion axiom see: Machina, Mark, Siniscalchi, Marciano. “Ambiguity and Ambiguity 
Aversion.” To appear in: The Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty, Accepted: 
June 2013, 20 
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𝑊 ℱ ∙ = 𝛼 ∗	  min¦∈𝒞 𝑈 ℱ ∙ 𝑑𝜇 + 1 − 𝛼 ∗	  max¦∈𝒞 𝑈 ℱ ∙ 𝑑𝜇    (21) 
This value based Maxmin function now is able to account for a range of ambiguous decisions 
larger than that of the von Neumann and Morgernstern model. This model says that agents 
behave as if there exists a set of possible probabilities with a fixed utility function in order to 
compute their expect utility for any act; then the agents take the lowest possible probability and 
apply it across a set of outcomes.  This is also known as a weighted average of the most 
pessimistic and the most optimistic expected utility values.   
3.3: Rank-Dependent Utility 
 Rank-Dependent Utility was formalized by Quiggin (1982)39 which ranked events based 
on probability weights, where probability weights can be interpreted as the importance that 
agents weight some outcome xj .40  Rank-dependence is also used in Yaari’s Dual Theory (1987), 
which is described in section 4.1 of this paper.  Rank-dependence is also an important feature of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s 1992 Cumulative Prospect Theory model.41  Rank-Dependent Utility 
was developed as a “better” version of Expected Utility theory, and the Rank-Dependent Utility 
model does not overweight extremely unlikely events so that there are not violations of first-
order stochastic dominance like in Prospect Theory.  
The general weight model for Rank-Dependent Utility is defined as:42 𝜋¬𝑈 𝑥¬3¬45            (22) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*** Gilboa, Itzhak., Schmeidler, David.  “Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior.”  
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1989, Vol. 18, 143-144 
39 Quiggin, John., “A theory of anticipated utility.” Journal of economics behavior and 
organization, 1982, Vol. 3(4), 323-343 
40 Diecidue, Enrico, Wakker, Peter.,  “On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility.”  The Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty., 2001, Vol. 23 (3), 283. 
41 Tuthill, Jonathan, Frechette, Darren., “Non-expected Utility Theories: Weighted Expected, 
Rank Dependent, and, Cumulative Prospect Theory.”  St. Louis, Missouri., April 2002. P. 17. 
Accessed April 2016.  http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/19073/1/cp02tu01.pdf 
42 Diecidue, Enrico, Wakker, Peter.,  “On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility.”  The Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty., 2001, Vol. 23 (3), 281-298. 
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Where U is the utility function, the 𝜋¬’s are decision weights, which are nonnegative and sum to 
one, and the xj’s  are the different outcomes for various lotteries.  The assumption of rank-
dependence is incredibly important for utility theory because it relaxes the independence axiom 
and assumes that agents are either pessimistic or optimistic.  Pessimism and optimism are 
important in this case because of the tier valued system used to define agent behavior.  The 
model to be shown displays pessimistic behavior in agents through the distribution function 
which assigns weights based on certain outcomes.  Additionally, agents are assumed to evaluate 
lotteries based on the worst possible outcome.43  This also is a similar phenomenon seen in the 
Maxmin Expected Utility model.  In Maxmin Expected Utility agents behave as if there is a set 
of possible probabilities with a fixed utility function in order to compute their expected utility for 
any act.  However, they [the agents] apply the probability from the act that yields the lowest 
expected utility.  This, in conjunction, is similar to Rank-Dependent Utility because the agents 
ordering for events are based on their pessimism and optimism of certain outcomes, and this 
pessimism or optimism infers a logical deduction of the probability of certain events occurring.44  
Quiggin uses simple lotteries and weighting functions to define relationships between risky and 
non-risky prospects.  He defines these as “certainty equivalences” or CE: 𝐼𝑓	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑐 ∈ 𝑋	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑎	  𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦	  	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠, 𝑋, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑦 ∈ 𝑌,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑌	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠,	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑐~𝑦	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝑖𝑡	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑏𝑒	  𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑	  𝑎	  𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦	  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡	   𝐶𝐸 	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑦, 𝑜𝑟: 𝑐 = 𝐶𝐸(𝑦)  (23) 
Therefore, for an outcome c that is non-risky and outcome y that is risky, if c is indifferent to y 
then it is called the certainty equivalent of y, hence CE(y).  The next important feature of the 
Rank-Dependent Utility model uses an axiom of independence, which is another modified 
version from the one originally published by von Neumann and Morgenstern.  It is defined as: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Diecidue, Enrico, Wakker, Peter.  “On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility.”  The Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty., 2001, Vol. 23 (3), 285 
44 Dillenberger, David, Postlewaite, Andrew, Rozen., Karen., “Optimism and Pessimism with 
Expected Utility.” February 2014, 1-19 
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RDU axiom of independence: 𝐹𝑜𝑟	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑝 ∈ [0,1] 
 𝐼𝑓	  𝑦5 = 𝑥, 𝑝 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦v = 𝑥V, 𝑝 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ	  𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑛, ∃:	  	  𝑐0 = 𝐶𝐸 𝑥0, 𝑥0V ; 12 , 12 , 𝑖 ∈ 1,2… , 𝑛, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑥5∗ = 𝐶𝐸 𝑦5 , 𝑥v∗ = 𝐶𝐸 𝑦v .	  	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛:	  𝑐; 𝑝 ~ 𝑥5∗, 𝑥v∗ , 5v , 5v            (24) 
All of this means that if each non-risky element, c, is indifferent to a 50-50 bet consisting of 
corresponding risky elements x and x’ then the set {c;p}is indifferent to to a 50-50 bet consisting 
of the certainty equivalents {x;p} and {x’;p}.45  This is its way of solving the risky versus non-
risky problem that is presented in the Ellsberg Paradox.  Since the new axiom of independence 
was established, Quiggin makes two assumptions, which led to the primary achievements of the 
Quiggin paper.  The assumptions are made for the sake of a utility function that preserves 
preference ordering, which then also preserve original preference relationships that are described 
by von Neumann and Morgenstern.  The assumptions are: 𝐴1: 𝐼𝑓	  𝑥5, … , 𝑥3 ∈ 𝑋, 	  𝑥3𝑃®¯°±𝑃, … , 𝑃®±	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	   𝑝0 = 10 , 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	   𝑥; 𝑝 ∈ 𝑌    	  𝐴2: 𝐼𝑓	  𝑦 ∈ 𝑌	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  ∃	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑥 = 𝐶𝐸 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋	              (25 a-b) 
The first assumption says that there exists some set of outcomes, X, and associated probabilities, 
P, with lotteries occurring (and their probabilities sum to one) and the set of the lotteries and 
probabilities together is the payoff set, namely Y.  The second assumption says that there exists 
some elements of X and Y that are certainty equivalents of each other.  These assumptions 
together imply that there is some set of outcomes, X, with associated probabilities, P, that, when 
evaluated by the agent, all belong to the set of all possible outcomes of X and P called set Y.  
Since these outcomes and probability mixtures exist within Y it is possible to say that there exists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Quiggin, John., “A theory of anticipated utility.” Journal of economics behavior and 
organization, 1982, Vol. 3(4), 332 
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some certainty equivalents of outcomes xi to outcomes yi.  These two assumptions led to a very 
important three-part theorem, which was the major contribution of the Quiggin paper, it reads: 𝑇1: 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒	  𝑋	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑌	  𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑦	  𝐴1	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝐴2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑃	  𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑛V𝑠	  4	  𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑜𝑚𝑠46	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑅𝐷𝑈	  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒:	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛	  ∃	  𝑎	   𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑉: 𝑌 → ℛ3, 𝑠𝑡:	  
 𝑖:	  	  𝑉 𝑦 ≥ 𝑉 𝑦V , 𝑖𝑓𝑓	  𝑦 ≽ 𝑦V	  𝑖𝑖: 𝑉 𝑥; 𝑝 = ℎ0 𝑝 𝑈 𝑥00 	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	  𝑈	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  ℎ, 	  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  ℎ 1 = 1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  ℎ 12 , 12 = 12 , 12 .	  	  	  𝐼𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	  𝑉	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑉V𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑦	  𝑖	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑖𝑖, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  ∃	  	  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠	  𝑎	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑏, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑎 > 0,	  	  	  𝑠𝑡:	  𝑖𝑖𝑖: 𝑉V 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑉 𝑦 + 𝑏           (26) 
This theorem states that if the first two assumptions are satisfied, as well as the priors satisfied 
by the Rank-Dependent Utility independence axiom and non-degeneracy, then there is a utility 
function V that maps the outcome set Y onto the set of real numbers.  By doing this the utility 
function is able to satisfy three conditions depending on the prior, act, and state.  The first states 
that V is a utility function.  That is, if the function is applied to y and y’, and y yields the same or 
higher utility, then y is as least as preferred as y’.  The second part states that if a utility function 
is applied to the set (x;p) where p is a prior, then the yielded utility will be the result of two 
separate utility functions applied on the prior and some xi within that set.  Similarly, if the utility 
function for the prior is equal to one then the prior will just be a weight of one and if it is a 50-50 
bet then the prior will be a 50-50 distribution.  Statement three says that if the utility functions, V 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For full detail of axioms 1-3 (axioms 4 is RDU Independence), see: Quiggin, John., “A theory 
of anticipated utility.” Journal of economics behavior and organization, 1982, Vol. 3(4), 331-
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and V’, which satisfy parts one and two of the theorem, then they are affine transformations of 
one another.47 
In order to properly define the full Rank-Dependent model, it is necessary to elaborate on 
the application of decision weights.  A decision weight is essentially how much an agent will 
focus on a given probability, so therefore it is a weight applied on that probability.  Additionally, 
decision weights tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight moderate and high 
probabilities.48  However, because the transformations occur with cumulative rather than 
individual probabilities, the problem of over and under weighted decision weights, as described 
by Quiggin, do not occur in the Rank-Dependent model.  Thus the maximum outcome of a 
particular lottery depends on its probability and not the decision weights.  If a lottery depends 
only on probability p, then its position based on rank will always be one, because then the 
outcome is the maximal outcome of the lottery.  Therefore, if we define the function 𝜔(𝑝) as a 
decision weight and 𝜔 is strictly increasing, such that preference relations satisfy stochastic 
dominance, then define the full Rank-Dependent Utility model (RDU) as described by Quiggin 
in 1982:   
If xj is an outcome where 𝑥5 > ⋯ >	  𝑥3 then 𝑅𝐷𝑈 𝑝5𝑥5;… ; 𝑝3𝑥3 = 𝜋¬𝑈(𝑥¬)3¬45          (27 a.) 
Where for each 𝜋¬, we can define the function: 𝜋¬ = 𝜔 𝑝5 +⋯+ 𝑝¬ − 𝜔 𝑝5+⋯+ 𝑝¬5 	         (27 b.) 
And,  𝜋5 = 𝜔(𝑝5).   
This function can also be represented by Yaari’s dual function.  Therefore, with regards 
to the paradoxes explained earlier, the Rank-Dependent Utility model does not fail the various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Also known as: There exists constants, namely a and b, where a and b are greater than zero, so 
that V’ applied on decision y is the same as constant a applied on utility function V which is 
applied on decision set y plus b.   
48 Kahneman, Daniel, Tversky, Amos. “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty.”  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1992.  Vol. 5, 298 
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paradoxes because of its weakening of the independence axiom and the theorem listed earlier.  
The replacement of the Rank-Dependent axiom of independence allows for an agent to have a 
preference for hedging:  the 50-50 bet of two ambiguous acts, as they are in the Ellsberg 
Paradox, yields a completely objective lottery of a 50-50 probability mixture.  Then this occurs 
because the decisions in the Ellsberg Paradox are negatively correlated, as they are not 
comonotonic events, where a similar result occurs when Cumulative Prospect Theory is 
applied.49   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Machina, Mark, Siniscalchi, Marciano. “Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion.” To appear in: 
The Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty, Accepted: June 2013, 22 
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Section 4: Challenges to Non-Expected Utility Theory and Rationality Assumptions 
4.1 Aspirations and Obstacles 
Rubinstein (1998)50 considers three aspirations for economists: 
•   Construction of new theories of choice because there have been clear deviations in 
experiments from the rational man theory.51	  
•   The refinement of the notion of choice, for example, models that include intertemporal 
variables, in order to understand when agents make such decisions.	  
•   The transformations of the notion of equilibrium.  This is due to the fact that agents have 
to make inferences about the environment in which they operate.  Therefore, strategic 
interactions and rational expectations are based on assumptions that are not entirely 
correct.52	  
Rubinstein continues to state that the challenges for scholars of Bounded-Rationality are to 
actually include procedural aspects of decision making in specific economic theories.  With 
regards to the first of his three aspirations for economics to overcome, one can say that within 
the literature for Non-Expected Utility theory and Bounded-Rationality models, there have been 
plenty of new theories that take into account the experimental data.  In particular, Machina 
(2013)53 explains twelve new models for Ambiguity Aversion and explains their inner workings 
with regards to the Ellsberg Paradox.  To state things simply, it would be difficult to create one 
model that accounts for all [utility maximization] decisions made by agents.  However, these two 
fields [Non-Expected Utility and Bounded-Rationality] have done relevant work with regards to 
creating models, which satisfy and axiomatize decisions, especially in lottery-type situations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Rubinstein, Ariel. Modeling Bounded Rationality (MIT Press: 1998) 
51 Edwards, Ward. “The Theory of Decision Making.” Psychological Bulletin, 1954, Vol 51(4), 
380-417 
52 This relates to equilibrium because if decision makers are making decisions based on their 
preferences by analyzing the environment around them then those decisions directly effect the 
equilibrium in the economy. 
53 Machina, Mark, Siniscalchi, Marciano. “Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion.” To appear in: 
The Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty, Accepted: June 2013 
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The models created are not overarching models for the entire population, but they help to explain 
different types of preferences in different agents. 
 It is, however, important to show that paradoxical situations, such as the Ellsberg and 
Allais situations, can actualize in real world applications and not just in a laboratory 
environment.  A paper from Suhonen, Sasstamoinen, and Linden (2014)54 shows empirical 
observations from real life gambling markets, which correspond to the Allais experiment.  They 
develop a model, which appends Yaari’s (1987)55 Dual Theory model with probability weights 
using Prelec’s (1998)56,57 function.  In order to understand Yaari’s dual theory, it is necessary to 
understand the Dual axiom of independence: ∀𝑎 ∈ 0,1 , 𝐺 ≽ 𝐺V, 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑎𝐺 ⊞ 1 − 𝑎 𝐻 ≽ 𝑎𝐺V ⊞	   1 − 𝑎 𝐻   (28) 
Where G, G’, and H are Decumulative Distribution Functions (DDF’s), t is a state, and a is a 
weight.  Where DDF G is defined as: 𝐺(𝑣) = Pr 𝑣 > 𝑡 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1        (29) 
Such that integrating Gv(t)dt over the definite [0,1] integral gives the expected value of v. Doing 
this restricts the value of v and implies that no gambles can be made which might result in a loss 
greater than one’s total wealth.  Simultaneously, no gambles exist offering prizes larger than 
some predetermined number, therefore the gambles are all normalized.  This is different from a 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) in that a CDF will describe the likeliness of the 
probability of a random variable occurring that is smaller than some value, t.  Whereas the DDF 
describes the probability of some random variable that will be greater than some value, t. 
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55 Yaari, Menahem. “The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk.” Econometrica, Jan. 1987, Vol. 
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This is important because it states that if functions are continuous then G(t-)=G(t). This also 
implies that DDF 𝐺 𝑡 = 𝐺(𝑡).  If they are not continuous functions, then the space in-between 
the two DDF’s is the x interval that is defined in earlier axioms of Yaari’s paper.  In this 
independence axiom, the mixture operator, ⊞, is defined as: 𝑎𝐺 ⊞ 1 − 𝑎 𝐻 = 𝑎𝐺5 + 1 − 𝑎 𝐻5 5      (30) 
Meaning that, the mixture operator takes the inverse of DDF’s G and H, then takes the mixture 
of the two DDF’s, and then takes the inverse of the DDF’s G and H again after the mixture 
operation has occurred.  This makes it so that the mixture of the DDF’s is taken horizontally and 
not vertically, which is important if the DDF’s are not continuous.   
This independence axiom is very similar to that of Comonotonic Independence from 
Kahneman and Tversky, in that it uses comonotonic prospects to define the independence of 
decision making in lottery-type situations.  Yaari’s theorem then states, based on the von 
Neumann and Morgenstern axioms, with the dual independence axiom in place of the original 
independence axiom, that preference relationships satisfy these axioms if and only if there exists 
a continuous and nondecreasing real function, f, defined on the unit interval, u, for all u and v, 
where v is a random variable representing a simple lottery, such that: 𝑢 ≽ 𝑣 ⟺ 𝑓 𝐺¸ 𝑡 𝑑𝑡 ≥ 𝑓 𝐺¹ 𝑡55 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑡	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑎	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒    (31) 
This function is the representative theorem of Yaari’s 1987 paper.  It states that a random 
variable, u, which is between zero and one, is at least as preferred as random variable v, if and 
only if, from the definite integral between zero and one, the resulting function multiplied by the 
DDF Gu for outcome t is greater than the same result between zero and one for DDF, Gv. As the 
paradoxes stands, the dual independence axiom says that no gambles that can be made which 
result in a loss greater than total wealth, and that no gambles exist which offer prizes larger than 
some predetermined number, which is known to the agent, and then all gambles are normalized 
through the DDF. 
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In order to fully understand the obstacles implied through the Suhonen, Sasstamoinen, 
and Linden paper, it is necessary to define Prelec’s function, which states: 𝑔 𝑝 = 𝑒(º3»)¼  58          (32) 
Where the g is one decision from the set G in Yaari’s Dual Theory model.  What is interesting 
about Prelec’s function is that a decrease in gamma allows it to become more convex to the right 
of 1/𝑒, which furthers the point by Prelec that as the amount of returns on lottery situations 
increases, the probability weighting function changes. This leads to the generalized form for the 
model used by Suhonen, Sasstamoinen, and Linden which is represented by: 𝑉 𝑃 = 	  𝑢 𝑟 + 𝑤 𝑝¬ [𝑢 𝑟¬ − 𝑢 𝑟¬5 ]3¬45       (33) 
Where u is the utility function, w is the weighting function, which is strictly increasing from 
[0.1] to [1].  The model is Rank-Dependent,59 becoming the Expected Utility model when the 
weight function is linear, and the Dual Theory model when the utility function is non-linear.  
They then proposed an alternate model for these real world applicable lottery situations.  The 
model is a variant of the general Rank-Dependent Utility model.  Suppose the Uncertainty 
Function is modeled with an increasing U, and continuous mapping 𝑈: 0,1 ⟶ [0,1] with U(0) 
= 0 and U(1) = 1, and r being the list of all r’s within outcome set R, where outcomes are listed 
from worst to best; for example, r1 is the worst outcome and rn is the best outcome.  Therefore, 
the model is:  𝑉 𝑃 = 	  𝑟 + 𝑈 𝑝¬ [𝑟¬ − 𝑟¬5]3¬45         (34) 
This particular Uncertainty Function is important for modeling real world uncertainty 
situations because it combines aspects of risk behavior and probability weighting.  Their model 
uses uncertainty through modeling simple lotteries that have uncertain outcomes (in this case, 
horse race betting behavior.)  Their results state that bettors’ behavior is invariant in time and in 
the scale of betting.  All that matters are the attitudes towards risk and uncertainty.  Their model 
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also shows that in real life decisions they were able to find the same preference patterns observed 
by Allais in 1953.  More amazingly, they were able to find these results in a real-world situation 
and not in a laboratory, which was one of the criticisms of the Allais experiment from Grether 
and Plott in 1979.60  Not only were these Allais-type results, but based on the data and analysis, 
the results were also statistically significant.  Their results show that gamblers are not only risk-
averse, but also prone to misperceptions of probabilities: over-weighing low probabilities and 
under-weighing high probabilities. This shows that people are very averse to uncertainty, as 
opposed to just slightly averse to it, like it is presented in the Dual Theory model.   
  Their paper on horse race betting and the Allais paradox was published in 2012, which 
was almost 60 years after the Allais paper.  The Allais paradox has received harsh criticism in 
the past; however, no one has been able to offer an actual approach that solves the paradox in 
terms of von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility theory.  Therefore, the question becomes, 
how do Non-Expected Utility theories and theories of Bounded-Rationality expect to find 
solutions to various paradoxes that have challenged rationality and its framework, on which 
economists have built their models?  One way is to incorporate the ideas of Rabin, who suggests 
that there is potential for using Neoclassical optimization models and psychological models to 
bound rationality within utility models.  Although suggesting the input of psychological 
modeling into economics is considered an unforgivable sin to most Neoclassical economists, 
Rabin states,  
 
“Other examples of human limits to rationality, I will argue, are genuinely best understood in 
terms of optimization models.  As surely as optimization captures cases of fully rational 
behavior, it captures the psychology and resulting behavior of some limits to rationality.”62  
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This statement is incredibly important because it means, in essence, that Bounded-Rationality 
models can use optimization models to study human behavior, but those optimization models 
also include psychological data, which economists generally do not interpret.  Rabin continues, 
“Many of the ways humans are less than fully rational are not because the right answers are so 
complex.  They are instead because the wrong answers are so enticing.”61  In this statement, I 
would say that agents are not fully rational not just because the wrong answers are so enticing, 
but at given moments, in given situations, and because of limits to information, agents are not 
fully rational.  It is not possible to blame agents for not being “fully rational,” due to the limits to 
information and time constraints, such that being “fully” rational (whatever that may entail) is 
nearly impossible.  This does not necessarily mean that agents are irrational, it simply means that 
agents are not perfect and at some point the amount of time it takes to gather all the relevant 
information before making a decision can be costlier than the actual decision.  Since systematic 
errors occur frequently in optimization models, same as they do for agents in their daily life, it 
would be optimal for economists to capture these systematic errors and incorporate them into 
models.62   
4.2 Rationality and Neoclassicism 
Neoclassical economists have repeatedly attempted to describe possible issues with the 
ways in which Allais and Ellsberg went about their experiments which lead to the founding of 
these paradoxes.  The most famous example being Grether and Plott in 1979, who, despite 
displaying major arguments against the paradoxes, recreated the experiment taking into account 
their own theories of why Allais and Ellsberg could be wrong, and still found preference reversal 
behavior.  Grether and Plott outline two questions that are of particular interest and need to be 
answered in order for these psychological experiments to be seen as relevant to many 
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economists.  The first, “Does the phenomenon exist in situations where economic theory is 
generally applied?”63  The answer to this question is apparently “yes,” given that other paradoxes 
to Expected Utility theory have developed since the formulation of the Allais Paradox in 1953.  
An example is the paper explained above that shows Allais-type preference reversal behavior in 
horse race betting.  Therefore, there has been significant work done to show that the 
phenomenon does exist in places that utility theory generally applies.  The second question that 
Grether and Plott ask, “Can the phenomenon be explained by applying standard economic theory 
or some immediate variant thereof?”  This question is much more complex to answer.  It is 
difficult to answer this question as “yes” or “no;” since, the literature has proven more 
sophisticated.  Some economists, such as Grether and Plott, would claim that Non-Expected 
Utility theory is an extension of Neoclassical Utility theory.  Therefore, these types of 
economists would say that this phenomenon could be explained through the application of 
standard economic theory.  Some other economists, possibly Rabin,64 may claim that the answer 
would be the same as Grether and Plott’s answer, but for Bounded-Rationality models.  Even 
though Bounded-Rationality models are specified in the behavioral field, some may say that they 
are extensions of von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility theory, and are therefore 
neoclassical.  However, many, such as Winter,65 may answer “no” to the above question, and, 
economists who subscribe to a similar school of economic thought as Winter may make the 
claim that Neoclassical utility theory has failed to provide models that explain preference 
reversal behavior.  Despite the great differences between these economists, it is important to note 
that each branch of economic thought has made important contributions to utility theory.  
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This debate is likely to continue, but it is key to note what can be defined as rational.  
Edwards (1954) states that the “Economic man has three particular qualities.”66 The first quality 
says that homo economicus (the economic man) has all information, which is obviously a super-
human and impossible effort, which is what Edwards was attempting to convey.  The second 
quality is that homo economicus is infinitely sensitivity, meaning that it can be assumed that the 
alternatives available to any individual are continuous.  Simultaneously, there exists infinitely 
divisible functions, prices are infinitely divisible, and there are no transaction costs to agents’ 
decisions, in that homo economicus is sensitive to all of these functions, decisions, and 
divisibility of these outcomes.  Finally, Edwards defines rationality as meaning two things: First, 
that homo economicus can weakly order the states that he receives, and second, he can (and 
does) make choices to maximize something. 
Edwards sees the major problem with the rationality argument is the axiom of transitivity 
of preferences.  Consequently, transitivity and independence are the two major axioms that have 
been shown not to hold in several situations.   Hodgson (2012)67 claims that the fault in utility 
maximization models, whether expected or non-expected, is the universal applicability for which 
economists strive.  The quest for this generality greatly limits models, according to Hodgson 
(and Rodrik), and it is because of the counter examples that game theory models have 
contributed that traditional rationality and Neoclassical Expected Utility models have been 
greatly challenged.  There are several instances where game theory has challenged aspects of 
rationality in economics.  For example, viewing the Ellsberg paradox in a game theory format 
has challenged various Non-Expected Utility theories.68  Machina and Siniscalchi (2013) view 
this phenomenon and show that the Choquet model is “incapable of exhibiting such a 
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preference” despite the model evaluating the bets according to the Choquet model. 69   Hodgson 
states that game theory models have challenged the ‘as if’ of rationality.  This implies that agents 
act ‘as if’ they and other agents in a market are rational.  Hodgson’s major problem with this ‘as 
if’ assumption is that it requires economists to “treat individuals as capable of emulating 
incredible super-calculators with unbounded cognitive capacities, without any consideration of 
how they would manage to do this.”70   
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Section 5: A New Perspective on the Development of Utility Theories 
5.1 The Problem with Linearity of the Development of Utility Models 
Rodrik’s, Economics Rules details many of the problems with the thinking of economists.  
Rodrik does this by presenting many examples in Macroeconomics where the field has either 
gained immense generality or there is an inherent problem with the fact that economists apply 
models within in the first steps of examining a problem, as opposed to doing a more complete 
analysis before applying a model to a situation.  Rodrik also says that the major reason 
economists separate themselves from other social sciences is because economists have models 
and use mathematics; however, models are the framework to yield solutions for many situations.  
For utility theorists, such as those described above, utility theory has been seen as a field that has 
moved linearly, and that is not the fault of utility theory, but a reflection of the general trend in 
economics.  To be linear in development I mean that a model successfully describes agent 
behavior for some time and then a paradox is found and then a new model has to be found in 
order to account for the inconsistency of a present part of said model.  Though this is true for 
most sciences, it has particularly plagued utility theory.  That is exactly how the field has 
progressed linearly.  This linear progression has has limited the scope of utility theory.  The 
argument is that utility models need to be looked at as useful for specific situations.  Analyzing a 
situation with a model already in mind can be helpful such that a situation can then be easily 
analyzed.  Similarly, if a model can be applied quickly to a situation, then it is likely that the 
situation can be solved rather simply.  However, it is not always the case that the model that is in 
mind is the correct model for a particular situation; thus, a model that has worked in the past for 
a different scenario, but in a different scenario an economist may forego some of the 
assumptions of the situation so that said model will work.  This does not mean that economists 
need a new model for every situation; in fact, that would make the field overly complex, and the 
problem with the development of models would continue.  This also does not mean that it is 
necessary for economists to create a generally encompassing model for the world, because doing 
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that would be next to impossible, and a model of that size would be useless.  However, in utility 
theory it seems that this is the direction that utility theorists are headed.  This would be, as they 
say in the case of the cartographers in Borges, similar to a map that encompasses and is the size 
of an entire region, useless.  
 Rodrik discusses these points for Macroeconomics, but they can also be applied to utility 
theory.  Linear developments in utility theory have historically helped the beginnings of the 
evolution of economic thought.  The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith in 1759 related 
the notion of utility to the overall behavior of the rich and poor in society.  This relation was 
important for the development of economic thought because it influenced a host of different 
thinkers in economics ranging from the marginalists to utilitarians.  Through the development of 
these different types of schools of economic thought the idea of modeling behavior of agents 
came about.  These developments have drastically changed given that now economists have 
complex mathematical models of utility theory.  The changes that have evolved in utility theory 
and the progress that has been made is incredibly significant.  However, for true progress to be 
made, economists need to recognize the different ways that utility models have developed. 
Through changing the structure of the view of utility theory it will be easier to see the links 
between different models and therefore be easier to see the commonalities of the models and 
how utility theorists can exploit those similarities to create better models and better agent 
behavior.  Similarly, this will also allow for more work to be done across different schools of 
economic thought in utility theory.  This view will simultaneously help economists so that they 
do not attempt to create models that are so general that the model does not actually describe 
anything helpful. 
5.2 Development Tree of Utility Theories 
The main contribution of this paper is to say that all of these models have their significant 
contributions, and they all have their uses, however, to classify any one of them as “the 
economic utility model” would be incorrect.  Economists have strived to create the best models 
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possible and in many ways they have succeeded, but it is important is to look at how these 
models work in various situations, and what the mathematics of them can tell economists about 
agent behavior in risk averse and ambiguous decisions.  All these models tell economists 
something different, and their uses are all pertinent.  Utility theorists need to stop viewing utility 
theory as a paradoxical world that needs to be solved, but instead as a world that is incredibly 
complex and that there are different solutions for different worldly occurrences.  This goes for 
different behaviors for utility maximization, different classes, countries, and agents.   
 Additionally, as useful as the theories might be, it is important to recognize that every 
agent will not fit into a mathematical equation.  Due to the current view of development, utility 
theory has progressed linearly, as a progression of model and paradox, but instead I provide a 
chart proposing how economists should view the developments of utility theory.  This chart is 
different because it recognizes how the different branches of utility theory have changed and 
evolved because of each other.  The present evolutional view is the linear development of utility 
theories.  However, the chart that I provide describes various utility models in economics and 
shows how they are built from each other, despite belonging to different fields of economic 
thought.  By doing this, I am able to show the dominant model(s) in each field and represent a 
paradox that may have caused a failure for a particular utility model in a particular situation.  
Though this tree is obviously not complete, it does show the basic models and some lesser 
known models for various branches of utility theory.  The diagram is split into three different 
branches of utility theory: The Empirical, the Abstract, and the Subjective, respectively from left 
to right.  Further down the chart we see that the independence axiom similarities between 
Quiggin’s Rank-Dependent utility model and Cumulative Prospect Theory links these two 
branches of economic thought.  Similarly, I show that agents acting pessimistically relate the 
Maxmin model to the Rank-Dependent model.  Through defining pessimism and optimism as a 
property that is not typically found in Neoclassical Utility models, I claim that Subjective 
developments of utility models are, albeit closely relate, different from neoclassical 
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development.  This shows that all three branches are closely linked to each other through their 
axioms and equations.  The paradoxes are in red, and the links between the branches are in 
green.71 
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5.3 A New View of Development 
If economists were to view all utility theories strictly as direct extensions of Neoclassical 
Utility theory, then they would miss many important developments of utility theory.  Viewing 
these paradoxes and the models in a “tree” type development, makes it easy to see that there are 
successes and failures in each branch and it is important to use the successes of the various 
branches.  By viewing the tree as three different branches, the Empirical, the Abstract, and the 
Subjective72 economists are able to take the successes from the various branches and have a wide 
variety of models for the apparent wide variety of lottery-type situations.  It is shown that the 
connections between the branches allows for progress in utility theory, and that is why the major 
contribution of this paper is to show the connections between these branches.  As stated and 
shown, without the development of Quiggin’s Rank-Dependent Model the furthered 
development of Cumulative Prospect Theory would have been much more difficult.  However, it 
is because of Anscombe and Aumann that Maxmin Expected Utility was created by Gilboa and 
Schmeidler.  Additionally, because of rank-dependent aspects and the contribution from Quiggin 
with regards to pessimism and optimism describing how agents rank probabilities assigned to 
outcomes, it is shown that pessimism and optimism leads to the assumption from Quiggin which 
assumes that agents apply the lowest ranking probability to all possible outcomes.  These 
connections between the fields of utility theory are what make progress happen.  By 
acknowledging the connections and showing that all these models are related, it can be said that 
the most significant progress can only be made through significant research outside of a 
particular subfield of utility theory. 
Rodrik lists several commandments for economists at the end of his book Economics 
Rules, I have taken five of his commandments and direct these ones specifically for utility 
theorists: 
1.   Economics is a collection of models; cherish their diversity. 
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2.   It’s a model, not the model. 
3.   Make your model simple enough to isolate specific causes and how they work, but not so 
simple that it leaves out key interactions among causes. 
4.   Unrealistic assumptions are OK; unrealistic critical assumptions are not OK. 
5.   To map a model to the real world you need explicit empirical diagnostics, which is more 
craft than science.   
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Section 6: Conclusion 
 Economics is a massive field.  It is a social science that has seen explosive development 
within the last 100 years, and it is a field that influences all other social sciences.  With this 
in mind, it is important to remember that before Adam Smith’s famous The Wealth of 
Nations came The Theory of Moral Sentiments.  The beginnings of utility theory are 
important and so are the developments from the 19th century with the emergence of 
marginalists and utilitarians, which led to 20th and 21st century utility theory.  The thinkers of 
the 20th century created a broad field that has defined many important models for utility 
theorists, and this micro thinking has even greatly influenced macroeconomists.   
In short, utility models are incredibly important and their developments are also essential 
to understand the history of modern economic thought and the future development of utility 
modeling.  For this particular reason, I have provided the above flow chart of utility models, 
their developments, connections, as well as the list of commandments from Rodrik.  If 
economists stop viewing the development of utility theory as linear, then they can start to 
take the benefits from each branch of utility theory and apply that to the failures of other 
utility models.  This approach yields a more concrete and complete view of utility modeling 
and will be more beneficial for the future development of utility models.  Competition of 
different branches of utility theory and other sciences leads to progress; it is important to 
recognize the work of other branches and find places to improve.  What the behavioralists 
may call irrational an optimization economist may call constrained optimization, and the 
meeting point between them is Bounded-Rationality.  When I discuss the development of 
utility theory as linear, what I mean is the “paradox, model…” type development and how 
harmful this view can be.  So much so that Rodrik wrote a book about it, I am simply 
offering a warning to utility theorists, providing a solution, and some of the connections 
between the models, both mathematically and intuitively.  The three types of schools of 
utility theorists which I describe each have their various uses in particular situations.  For 
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example, behavior models are very useful where there is data present, such as data derived 
derived from behavioral experiments similar to the data generated in the Ellsberg and Allais 
paradoxes, and when economists attempt to justify utility models, which are typically used to 
understand conceptual agent behavior.73  In conjunction, models that use subjective 
probabilities are very useful for understanding conceptual agent behavior through the use of 
probability weights74 and agents beliefs of pessimistic versus optimistic outcomes.  
Similarly, Neoclassical utility theory has its place in defining agent rationality and making 
axioms to conceptualize the reasoning behind agents preferences.75   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Darnton, Andrew, “An overview of behavior change models and their uses.”  Centre for 
Sustainable Development, University of Westminster, July 2008, 34  
74 Hampton, J. M., Moore, P.G., “Subjective Probability and its Measurement.”  Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 136(1), 1973., 21-42 
75 Simon, Herbert., “Rationality in Psychology and Economics.”  The Journal of Business, Vol. 
59(4), Oct. 1986., S210	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Appendix of Definitions, Formulas and Models: 
(1) Expected Utility, Daniel Bernoulli:  𝑝0 𝑈 𝑥03045 	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
 
(2) von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms and general terminology for Preference Relations: 
A preference relation is denoted as ≽, (which is a binary relation on the set of alternatives, 𝑋 ⊂ℛ3, allows us to compare outcomes) where 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑥 ≽ 𝑦 is read as “x is at least as good 
as y.”  Similarly, 𝑥 ≻ 𝑦 is read as “x is strictly preferred to y.”  And, 𝑥~𝑦 is read as “x is 
indifferent to y.” 
(a) Completeness: ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋,𝑤𝑒	  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒	  𝑥 ≽ 𝑦	  𝑜𝑟	  𝑦 ≽ 𝑥	  𝑜𝑟	  𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ	   𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ	  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑥 ∼ 𝑦  
(b) Transitivity: ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋	  𝑖𝑓	  𝑥 ≽ 𝑦	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦 ≽ 𝑧, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝑥 ≽ 𝑧 
(c) Independence: 𝑇ℎ𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	   ≽𝑜𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒	  𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠, Λ, 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑜𝑚	  𝑖𝑓	  ∀	  𝜆, 𝜆V, 𝜆VV ∈Λ	  and	  α ∈ 0,1 , we	  have: 𝜆 ≽ 𝜆V𝑖𝑓𝑓	  𝛼𝜆 + 1 − 𝛼 𝜆VV ≽ 𝛼𝜆V + 1 − 𝛼 𝜆′′	   
(d) Continuous: 𝑇ℎ𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≽𝑜𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒	  𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠	  	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠	  𝑖𝑓	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑎𝑛𝑦	  𝜆, 𝜆V, 𝜆VV ∈ 𝛬, 𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠:	  𝛼 ∈ 1,0 : 𝛼𝜆 + 1 − 𝛼 𝜆V ≽ 𝜆VV ⊂ [0,1] 
and 𝛼 ∈ 1,0 : 𝜆VV ≽ 𝛼𝜆 + 1 − 𝛼 𝜆V ⊂ 0,1  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 
 
(3) Simple lotteries: 𝜆	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑎	  𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑎	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠, 𝑋,	  	  𝜆 = 𝑝5, …	  , 𝑝h 	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑝h ≥ 0	  ∀	  𝑛, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝛴3𝑝3 = 1, 𝐴𝑛𝑑	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠,	  	  𝑋 = 𝑥5, … , 𝑥3 , 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ	  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑝0 ∈ 𝜆 
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(4) Closed sets: 𝐹𝑖𝑥	  𝑎	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝛺 ⊂ ℛ3.	  	  𝐴	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝛣 ⊂ 𝛺	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑	  𝑖𝑓𝑓	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦	  𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	   𝜔~ 𝜔 ∈ 𝛺,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝜔~ ∈ 𝛣	  ∀	  𝑚,𝑤𝑒	  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒	  𝜔 ∈ 𝛣 
	  
(5) General form for the Prospect Theory model: 𝛴0453 𝑣 𝑥0 ∗ 𝜋 𝑝0    
 
(6)  First-order Stochastic Dominance 𝐿𝑒𝑡	  	  𝑥	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑥	  𝑏𝑒	  𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚	  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	  	  𝐹 𝑥 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑:	  𝐹 𝑥 .	  	  	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝐹	  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 − 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟	  𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦	  𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐹	  𝑖𝑓	  𝐹(𝑥) ≤ 𝐹 𝑥
  
(7) Strict Monotonicity: 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡	  𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦:	  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≽ 𝑜𝑛	  𝑋	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝑖𝑓	  ∀	  𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦 ≫𝑥	  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑦 ≻ 𝑥.	  	  𝐼𝑡	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝑖𝑓	  𝑦 ≥ 𝑥	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦 ≠ 𝑥	  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑦	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑦 ≻ 𝑥  
 
(8) Comonotonicity: 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	  𝑓	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑔	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  	  𝑖𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑛𝑜	  𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠,	  𝑠, 𝑠V	  𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡:	  𝑓 𝑠 ≻ 𝑓 𝑠V 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑔 𝑠 ≼ 𝑔 𝑠V    
 
(9) Comonotonic Independence: 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑓 ≻ 𝑔	  	  ⟹ 𝛼𝑓 + 1 − 𝛼 ℎ ≻ 𝛼𝑔 + 1 − 𝛼 ℎ	  	  	  ∀𝛼 ∈ 0,1 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑓, 𝑔, ℎ	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐    	  𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒	  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑	  𝑎𝑠	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠	  𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛	  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  	  𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐 
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(10) Double Matching: ∀	  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	  𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑖𝑓	  𝑓 ≈ 𝑔	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑓 ≈ 𝑔, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝑓 ≈ 𝑔,	  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑔 ∈ ℛ	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑓	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑔 ∈ ℛ  
 
(11) Prospects (Acts): 𝐹 = 𝑓: 𝑆 → 𝑋 ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝐹	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠, 𝑓.	  	  𝑆	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑎	  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑋	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠. 
 
(12) Theorem 1: Kahneman and Tversky: 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒	   𝐹, ≽ 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	   𝐹, ≽ 	  𝑐𝑎𝑛	  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑎	  𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛.	  	  	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛	   𝐹, ≽ 	  𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑦	  𝑖𝑓𝑓	  𝑖𝑡	  𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔	  	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
 
(13) Tradeoff Consistency: 𝐼𝑓	  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦	  𝑥, 𝑥V, 𝑦, 𝑦V ∈ 𝑋, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦	  𝑓, 𝑓V, 𝑔, 𝑔V ∈ 𝐹, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝑙𝑒𝑡	  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	   𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝑥 𝑟 𝑓	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑥	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒	  𝑟	  𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  	  𝑓	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠. 𝑆𝑜	  𝑎	  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓	  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦	  𝑖𝑓:	   𝑥 𝑠 𝑓 ≽ 𝑦 𝑠 𝑔, 	  𝑥V 𝑠 𝑓 ≽ 𝑦V 𝑠 𝑔	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑥 𝑡 𝑓V ≽ 𝑦 𝑡 𝑔V	  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑥V 𝑡 𝑓V ≽ 𝑦V 𝑡 𝑔′ 
 
(14) Comonotonic Tradeoff Consistency: 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐	  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓	  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦	   𝐶𝑇𝐶 	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟	  𝑇𝐶	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	  	  𝑥 𝑠 𝑓, 𝑦 𝑠 𝑔, 𝑥V 𝑠 𝑓, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦V 𝑠 𝑔	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒	  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐, 𝑎𝑠	  𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙	  𝑎𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	  	  𝑥 𝑡 𝑓V, 𝑦 𝑡 𝑔V, 𝑥V 𝑡 𝑓V𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦′{𝑡}𝑔′. 
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(15) Sign-Comonotonic Tradeoff Consistency: 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑	  𝑖𝑓	  𝐶𝑇𝐶	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟	  𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑥, 𝑥V, 𝑦, 𝑦V𝑎𝑟𝑒	  𝑒𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑜𝑟	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 
(16) Theorem 2: Kahneman and Tversky:	  𝑎. 𝐸𝑈𝑇	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑖𝑓𝑓 ≽ 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑇𝐶	  𝑏. 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑦	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑖𝑓𝑓 ≽ 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝐶𝑇𝐶	  𝑐. 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑦	  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠	  𝑖𝑓𝑓 ≽ 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑆𝐶𝑇𝐶 
 
(17) Maxmin Expected Utility Function: 𝑊 𝑓 ∙ = 	  min¦∈𝒞 𝑈 𝑓 ∙ 𝑑𝜇  
 
(18) Roulette Lottery: 
In this system, a roulette lottery is defined as a game of change with “physical probabilities” 
associated with the outcomes, where each outcome is associated with a prize.  Additionally, a 
“physical probability” is defined as a probability whose outcomes are objective and associated 
with random physical systems, such as roulette wheels 
 
(19) Certainty-Independence: ∀	  𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠	  𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝛬, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  ℎ ∈ 𝐿¨	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  ∀𝛼 ∈ 0,1 :	  𝑓 ≻ 𝑔	   ⟺ 𝛼𝑓 + 1 − 𝛼 ℎ ≻ 𝛼𝑔 + 1 − 𝛼 ℎ 
 
(20) Uncertainty Aversion: ∀	  𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠	  𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝛬	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝛼 ∈ 0,1 : 𝑓 ∼ 𝑔	  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	  𝛼𝑓 + 1 − 𝛼 𝑔 ≽ 𝑓 
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(21) General complete Maxmin Expected Utility function: 
𝑊 ℱ ∙ = 𝛼 ∗	  min¦∈𝒞 𝑈 ℱ ∙ 𝑑𝜇 + 1 − 𝛼 ∗	  max¦∈𝒞 𝑈 ℱ ∙ 𝑑𝜇 
 
(22) General Rank-Dependent Weight Model: 𝜋¬𝑈(𝑥¬)3¬45   
 
(23) Certainty Equivalence: 𝐼𝑓	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑐 ∈ 𝑋	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑎	  𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦	  	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠, 𝑋, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑦 ∈ 𝑌,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑌	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑠𝑒𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑎𝑙𝑙	  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠,	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑐~𝑦	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  𝑖𝑡	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑏𝑒	  𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑	  𝑎	  𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦	  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡	   𝐶𝐸 	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑦, 𝑜𝑟: 𝑐 = 𝐶𝐸(𝑦)  
 
(24) Rank-Dependent Utility axiom of independence: 𝐹𝑜𝑟	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑝 ∈ [0,1] 
 𝐼𝑓	  𝑦5 = 𝑥, 𝑝 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑦v = 𝑥V, 𝑝 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ	  𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑛, ∃:	  	  𝑐0 = 𝐶𝐸 𝑥0, 𝑥0V ; 12 , 12 , 𝑖 ∈ 1,2… , 𝑛, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑥5∗ = 𝐶𝐸 𝑦5 , 𝑥v∗ = 𝐶𝐸 𝑦v .	  	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛:	  𝑐; 𝑝 ~ 𝑥5∗, 𝑥v∗ , 5v , 5v     
 
(25) Assumptions 1 and 2 from Rank-Dependent Utility: 
(a.)  𝐴1: 𝐼𝑓	  𝑥5, … , 𝑥3 ∈ 𝑋, 	  𝑥3𝑃®¯°±𝑃, … , 𝑃®±	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	   𝑝0 = 10 , 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	   𝑥; 𝑝 ∈ 𝑌   	  
(b.)  𝐴2: 𝐼𝑓	  𝑦 ∈ 𝑌	  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  ∃	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑥 = 𝐶𝐸 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋	    
 
(26) Rank-Dependent Utility Theorem 1: 
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𝑇1: 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒	  𝑋	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑌	  𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑦	  𝐴1	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝐴2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑃	  𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑛V𝑠	  4	  𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑜𝑚𝑠	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑅𝐷𝑈	  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒:	  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛	  ∃	  𝑎	   𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑉: 𝑌 → ℛ3, 𝑠𝑡:	  
 𝑖:	  	  𝑉 𝑦 ≥ 𝑉 𝑦V , 𝑖𝑓𝑓	  𝑦 ≽ 𝑦V	  𝑖𝑖: 𝑉 𝑥; 𝑝 = ℎ0 𝑝 𝑈 𝑥00 	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	  𝑈	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  ℎ, 	  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  ℎ 1 = 1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	  ℎ 12 , 12 = 12 , 12 .	  	  	  𝐼𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	  𝑉	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑉V𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑦	  𝑖	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑖𝑖, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	  ∃	  	  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠	  𝑎	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑏, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑎 > 0,	  	  	  𝑠𝑡:	  𝑖𝑖𝑖: 𝑉V 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑉 𝑦 + 𝑏     
 
(27) Full Rank-Dependent Utility model:76 
(a.) 𝑅𝐷𝑈 𝑝5𝑥5;… ; 𝑝3𝑥3 = 𝜋¬𝑈(𝑥¬)3¬45    
(b.) Decision Weights of the Rank-Dependent Utility Model: 𝜋¬ = 𝜔 𝑝5 +⋯+ 𝑝¬ − 𝜔 𝑝5+⋯+ 𝑝¬5 	    
 
(28) Dual Independence: 𝐺 ≽ 𝐺V, 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑎𝐺 ⊞ 1 − 𝑎 𝐻 ≽ 𝑎𝐺V ⊞	   1 − 𝑎 𝐻 
 
(29) Decumulative Distribution Function: 𝐺(𝑣) = Pr 𝑣 > 𝑡 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1  
 
(30) Mixture Operator (⊞): 𝑎𝐺 ⊞ 1 − 𝑎 𝐻 = 𝑎𝐺5 + 1 − 𝑎 𝐻5 5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Note that the probabilities do not occur within the model because they are accounted for in the 
Decision Weights. 
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(31) Yaari’s Representative Theorem: 
𝑢 ≽ 𝑣 ⟺ 𝑓 𝐺¸ 𝑡 𝑑𝑡 ≥ 𝑓 𝐺¹ 𝑡55 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	  𝑡	  𝑖𝑠	  𝑎𝑛	  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
 
(32) Prelec’s weight Function: 𝑔 𝑝 = 𝑒(º3»)¼ 
 
(33) Generalized Suhonen, Sasstamoinen, and Linden model: 𝑉 𝑃 = 	  𝑢 𝑟 + 𝑤 𝑝¬ [𝑢 𝑟¬ − 𝑢 𝑟¬5 ]3¬45    
 
(34) Uncertainty model from Suhonen, Sasstamoinen, and Linden: 𝑉 𝑃 = 	  𝑟 + 𝑈 𝑝¬ [𝑟¬ − 𝑟¬5]3¬45   
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